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ABSTRACT 
Research summary. This paper develops theory on how an organization’s structure affects future 
reorganizations. I highlight that a firm’s structure shapes not only the locus of decision-making 
power (i.e., centralization and decentralization) but also the employees’ interaction structure. 
I develop micro-level theory that connects the firm’s structure to the interactions among its 
employees – for instance, its influence on the time employees spend adjusting their behavior 
after a reorganization. This theory predicts that some structures are more likely than others to 
promote a reorganization to occur sooner. I use a unique, hand-collected data set of 
reorganizations in the cell-phone manufacturing industry to test and find directional support for 
this theory. 
 
Managerial summary. I examine the effect of a firm’s current structure on its corporate 
reorganization decisions, which are defined as the addition and/or removal of business units. 
I posit that the way employees are grouped into those business units may affect both the type and 
timing of subsequent reorganizations; the reason is that employees of similar (resp. different) 
backgrounds should need less (resp. more) time to achieve effective collaboration. Using data on 
the reorganizations of cell-phone manufacturing firms during 1983–2008, I find directional 
support for the theory. This result implies that managers may need to watch closely any 
reorganization that shifts the firm toward more heterogeneous interaction structures – because its 
implementation may well require additional time. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 2002 and 2012, LG Electronics reorganized its corporate structure nine times; Nokia 
announced eight reorganizations during the same period, and Yahoo! underwent two major 
reorganizations in 2012 alone. Corporate reorganizations – that is, the addition and/or removal of 
business units – are a common occurrence among multi-business entities (Allen, 1977; Karim, 
2006, 2009). Many firms choose to initiate reorganizations frequently even though doing so 
incurs costs due to disruption, changed operations, and de-motivated employees (Bond, Flaxman, 
& Bunce, 2008; Lamont, Williams, & Hoffman, 1994). 
Traditional perspectives on reorganizations have sought to identify what drives these 
costly changes – in particular, whether the triggers are internal or external to the firm (Boeker, 
1997; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; Karim & Kaul, 2015; Karim & Williams, 2012; 
March & Simon, 1958; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Although it is commonly acknowledged 
that reorganizations are driven by both internal and external factors, most of this literature 
focuses on the latter (Burns & alker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Donaldson, 2001). 
In contrast, this paper contributes to a growing literature that explores the role played by 
a firm’s current structure as an internal driver of reorganization decisions (Boumgarden, 
Nickerson, & Zenger, 2012; Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002). The main 
premise underlying these research efforts is that a firm’s structure is always inherently imperfect 
and entails tradeoffs. I examine such trade-offs between different structures more closely and 
develop theory to examine how current structure affects the type and timing of reorganizations.  
I highlight that reorganizations fundamentally affect two aspects of organization design: 
(1) the locus of decision-making power, as determined by centralization versus decentralization; 
and (2) the interaction structure among employees via the grouping of business units (i.e., by 
function, product, or market), which determines how they are expected to collaborate. The 
organization design literature tends to conflate these two aspects by assuming that centralization 
implies a functional form and decentralization a divisional one (and vice versa). Although the 
correlation between these choices may be high, I argue that carefully distinguishing between the 
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locus of decision making (centralized or decentralized) and the interaction structures among 
employees (grouped around functions, products, or markets) is a fruitful avenue for deepening 
our understanding of the effects of organization design on reorganizations. 
I build on the premise that all structures have limitations, which eventually trigger 
reorganizations intended to overcome them. I extend this reasoning to suggest a novel theoretical 
account that can explain the type and timing of reorganizations – whose seeds, I argue, are sown 
in the current structure. More specifically, I explore the effect of a firm’s current structure on the 
interactions among its employees. Focusing on how employees collaborate in response to 
changes in the firm’s direction allows me to explain (i) how a firm’s current structure affects the 
type of structure chosen in a reorganization and (ii) how the process of adjusting to different 
types of new structure affects the timing of subsequent reorganizations. 
The hypotheses developed here are tested in a longitudinal, large-sample study that relies 
on a unique data set of reorganizations in the global industry of manufacturing cell phones. The 
outcomes confirm the trend of reorganizations shifting away from their current interaction 
structure. These results accord with the literature’s emphasis on the importance of the focal 
firm’s structure as an internal driver of reorganizations. This connection has been widely 
theorized and also shown anecdotally in case studies (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Carnall, 1990; 
Cummings, 1995; Eccles & Nitin, 1992; Mintzberg, 1979), but I am not aware of any efforts to 
test it empirically in large samples. Furthermore, after controlling for external factors, I find that 
the firm’s current structure also affects how soon the next reorganization occurs. This finding 
offers directional support – at the macro-level – for the hypothesized micro-level timing effect. 
The results reported here contribute to the literatures on organization design and 
reorganizations. First, this study enriches our current understanding of reorganizations as 
oscillations between centralized and decentralized structures. By distinguishing the firm’s 
interaction structure from its decisions vis-à-vis centralization and decentralization, I underscore 
that repeated reorganizations allow organization designs to shift in ways that result in different 
structural interactions. This paper contends that a more fine-grained conceptualization of 
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structure can prepare the ground for deeper insights into organization design. For instance, I 
broaden the view of reorganization, as shifting decision-making power upward or downward, by 
conceptualizing it in terms of interaction structures with different foci, as influenced by the 
grouping decisions, that are adopted in response to the current structure’s limitations. Thus 
I explore interaction structures as a second factor vital to any reorganization, one that has been 
understudied and often confounded with research into the locus of decision-making power. 
Adopting this multi-dimensional view of organization design serves also to highlight the 
learning inherent in reorganizations. After one reduces the level of abstraction and recognizes 
that interaction structures lie on a continuum, it becomes more apparent that each re-design is a 
step forward but with a modified focus. Thus repeated reorganizations can be fruitfully viewed 
as a winding path up a complex, multi-peaked mountain range. In this metaphor, a firm might be 
climbing one performance peak only to realize that another peak – up a different slope – might 
lead to higher performance. It is crucial that this latter slope has a higher starting point than the 
former: the firm does not return to the bottom of the hill and start climbing again. It is only by 
scaling the first peak that the firm can reach the foot of the second one and perceive its 
advantages. 
Second, I develop theory on the connection between micro-level processes and macro-
level organizational outcomes. In particular, I propose the existence of a micro mechanism that 
underlies reorganization design choices and then explain why the timing of reorganizations may 
be critically influenced by who works with whom in the various business units. Although the 
available data can be used to test only the macro-level effects of my proposed mechanism, that is 
an essential first step in establishing this macro–micro link in reorganization decisions. Finally, 
the organization design literature tends to focus on environmental factors and to discount the 
firm’s current structure; environmental conditions are often viewed as being so determinative 
that an organization’s new design is effectively drawn up de novo when those conditions change. 
Yet the theory developed here underscores why a reorganization is more properly viewed as a re-
design that is both inspired and limited by the structure already in place. The implication of this 
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insight is that two firms may react to the same environmental shock by adopting organizational 
structures that are quite different – that is, because the choice of a new structure is affected by 
environmental demands and by the firms’ respective current structures. 
In addition to these theoretical contributions, I make two empirical ones. First, I conduct 
a large-sample empirical test of structure as a systematic driver of reorganizations. In this 
I extend current knowledge on the internal drivers of reorganizations by showing how different 
types of structure may asymmetrically influence the timing of the next reorganization. This 
timing effect also has direct managerial relevance: recognizing that adjustment rates differ as a 
function of the current structure can help managers improve the implementation of structural 
changes. Second, I demonstrate how one can measure and analyze structure itself – as well as 
differences among reorganizations – in terms of direction and timing. Shifting the analysis away 
from organization charts and toward business units enables development of a continuous 
measure that yields a more nuanced way to track, both conceptually and empirically, the changes 
in an organization’s design. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Structure as an Internal Driver of Reorganizations 
Various studies have investigated the role of current structure in reorganization decisions.1 In this 
context, structure is viewed as an important strategic tool that affects the locus of decision-
making authority. By choosing a structure, management effectively signals which direction the 
 
1 Over the past several decades, scholars have explored the drivers of reorganization in some detail. The causes most 
often studied are selection pressures exerted by changes in a firm’s scope and/or external environment (Burns & 
alker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Davis et al., 2009; Girod & Whittington, 2017; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Karim, 
Carroll, & Long, 2016) and the desire to innovate or to improve efficiency through repeated reorganizations (Karim, 
2006, 2009, 2012; Karim & Kaul, 2015). The adoption of new organizational forms may also be triggered by 
prevailing trends (Abrahamson, 1996) or by the diffusion of new forms among players that are tied together in 
organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). A reorganization may be initiated by internal factors also, such as 
changes in business unit managers (Karim & Williams, 2012) or in leadership – as when a new CEO looks to initiate 
a shift in strategy (Boeker, 1997; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Simons, 1994) or to shift the organization toward his 
own paradigm (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Miller, 1993; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). There are still other internal 
factors that can lead to reorganizations; examples include attempts to differentiate goals and re-direct attention 
(March & Simon, 1958), to counter “adverse learning” (Obloj & Sengul, 2012), to address politics and conflict 
(Cyert & March, 1963), and to improve collaboration (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). I address how the firm’s 
current structure affects both the type and timing of reorganizations. 
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firm intends to take and which strategic goals are considered most important (Cyert and March, 
1963/2001; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Thompson, 1967). This literature has focused on the 
centralization and decentralization of decision making. For example, Mintzberg (1979) noted 
that American corporations tend to shift repeatedly between these options, and Carnall (1980: 
18) identified the repeated choice between centralization and decentralization as one of the 
firm’s principal design dilemmas (see also Cummings, 1995; Eccles and Nohria, 1992). 
This oscillation between centralized and decentralized structures motivates the research 
exploring mechanisms that might account for this pattern (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002). In these papers, the oscillation between 
centralization and decentralization is interpreted as chief executive officers (CEOs) attempting to 
overcome the limitations of organizational structure. If one assumes that the firm’s structure can 
exhibit only discrete configurations (e.g., centralized or decentralized) and that the “ideal” 
organizational structure lies between them, then systematic oscillation in successive 
reorganizations should effect (at least temporarily) such a “middle way” solution – that is, given 
the slow adjustment of the firm’s informal organization to changes in its formal structure. On this 
account, then, CEOs oscillate between centralization and decentralization in order to prevent too 
strong an alignment with a particular structural form.  
Along similar lines, the effects of centralizing versus decentralizing tactical decision 
making – as regards, for instance, product or technology choices – have been explored in the 
telecommunications industry. For example, (Joseph, Klingebiel, & Wilson, 2016) discussed how, 
because of different problem-solving processes, the locus of decision making affects the content 
of a firm’s key strategic decisions. 
This field has generated a number of insights into how the firm’s current locus of task-
related decision-making authority both affects and is affected by reorganizations. Yet a firm’s 
structure influences not only those decision rights but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, the 
particular goals and challenges on which employees focus. It is thus the aggregate behavior of 
employees, as influenced by the firm’s structure, that ultimately determines an organization’s 
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outcomes and performance. A firm’s structure groups and links employees in certain ways, 
emphasizing some interactions more strongly than others. So in effect, structure determines 
which goals and challenges end up being prioritized. Hence I focus on this relatively 
underexplored dynamic of how a firm’s reorganizations are affected by its employees’ current 
interaction structure. 
Interaction Structure, Organization Design, and Centralization 
Establishing a design has two broad effects on the organization. First, it identifies the locus of 
decision-making power, which is reinforced by hierarchy and incentives, and establishes who has 
authority over which domains. Second, an organization design delineates interaction structures, 
which are reinforced by business units and shared goals, and establish who is to coordinate with 
whom. 
There are myriad possible interaction structures among the employees of a business unit. 
Consider, for example, one such unit with the four employees shown in Figure 1: two engineers 
(blue) and two salespeople (red). With four employees there are a total of six possible two-way 
interactions (black arrows) and 26 = 64 possible interaction structures (many of which allocate 
the same employee to more than one unit). So for a unit with N employees, there can be as many 
as M = N(N − 1)/2 two-way interactions and 2M = 2N (N−1)/2 possible interaction structures. 
[[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Despite this large set of structures, organization design tends to focus on functional and 
divisional structures (Chandler, 1962) or their combination as matrix structures (vis & Lawrence, 
1977). Whereas functional structures group individuals in terms of their functional expertise, the 
basis for divisional structures is grouping in terms of products or markets. 
Much of the literature presumes that functional and divisional structures are equivalent to 
(respectively) centralized and decentralized structures. Although this assumption may hold for 
the pure forms of such structures (e.g., the descriptions of DuPont and GM in (Chandler, 1962), 
the posited equivalence becomes problematic when one considers the many hybrid structures 
adopted by today’s organizations. For example, a matrix structure with global research and 
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development (R&D) and sales units and with multiple product-based units is difficult to 
categorize as being either centralized or decentralized. I argue that, although centralization and 
decentralization clearly capture the locus of decision-making power, functional and divisional 
structures are more reflective of particular chosen interaction structures. Clearly distinguishing 
between these two perspectives makes it easier to examine the different aspects of organization 
design and their effects, both theoretical and empirical, on reorganizations. 
Interaction Structure: Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Units 
There are distinct benefits associated with the two design options for the employee interaction 
structure at the business-unit level. A firm can either group individuals with the same functional 
expertise into homogeneous units (e.g., R&D or manufacturing units)2 or group individuals with 
distinctive areas of expertise into heterogeneous units (e.g., product- or market-based units).3 
Business units that emphasize homogeneous interaction structures (“homogenous units”) 
align incentives and goals among individuals of similar backgrounds. This approach eases 
communication and collaboration between employees by grouping together individuals with 
similar functional expertise; see panel (a) of Figure 2. A critical feature of homogeneous units is 
that they benefit from the strong similarity in how their employees view the world and perceive 
and prioritize problems (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dougherty, 1992; 
Joyce, 1986). These shared representations facilitate employee coordination, which tends to 
improve group performance (HUBER & LEWIS, 2010); for a review of the benefits and 
downsides of group diversity, see (kanth, Harvey, & Peterson, 2016) . When these benefits are 
aggregated to the level of corporate structure, homogeneous units enable economies of scale – 
for example, a global sales office that handles ten markets requires fewer employees and entails 
 
2 In this paper, I assume a direct mapping of homogeneous units onto functional units and of heterogeneous units 
onto product- or market-based units. However, the mapping may differ in other empirical contexts. 
3 The distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous units is a relative one. I do not mean to imply that 
homogeneous units contain employees with the exact same background; rather, the employees grouped by their 
functional expertise (say, engineers and scientists in an R&D lab) are relatively more similar to each other than are 
employees from various functional backgrounds who are grouped by a particular market or product line. 
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less operational overhead than would ten individual sales offices – thereby reducing costs and 
improving efficiency. 
[[ INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Yet because of their ability to generate such strong internal collaboration, homogeneous 
units tend to become increasingly isolated over time and to form functional “silos” with little or 
no communication across units (Chandler, 1962; Porter, 1985; Williamson, 1991). Hence the 
chief limitations of a corporate structure comprising many homogeneous units are poor – or 
nonexistent – cross-functional collaboration and severely compromised market responsiveness. 
The benefits of business units that emphasize heterogeneous interactions (“heterogeneous 
units”) mirror the limitations of a homogeneous grouping (and vice versa). At the business-unit 
level, heterogeneous units facilitate cross-functional communication by grouping individuals 
with distinctive areas of expertise; see panel (b) of Figure 2. Although effective coordination is 
then more difficult to achieve (HUBER & LEWIS, 2010), a well-established heterogeneous unit 
can improve product design and flexibility (Postrel, 2002) by emphasizing cross-functional 
collaboration through collocation and joint incentives – while simultaneously benefiting from the 
unit’s diversity of knowledge and perspectives (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Aggregating the 
benefits of heterogeneous units to the corporate level, the result is greater market 
responsiveness – as when, in an integrated product-based unit, information on market demand 
can be relayed more promptly and effectively to its internal R&D unit – in addition to greater 
flexibility and adaptability. However, it is expensive to maintain a corporate structure consisting 
of many heterogeneous units: each such unit may require its own R&D, sales, and marketing 
subunits, which increases costs because of duplicated effort. 
So how does the firm make this design choice between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
units – and thereby select its interaction structure? In line with the literature on the locus of 
decision making, I assume that a structure is chosen for the purpose of addressing a given broad 
challenge or goal. For example, a firm may aim to become more innovative, efficient, or 
customer oriented and therefore adjust its organization structure to support that strategy. 
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However, it is widely acknowledged that there are limits to the number of dimensions that a 
firm’s structure can effectively emphasize (Galbraith, 2008; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
Adopting a new structure, or even moving in that direction, involves trade-offs among the 
problems that a new structure could conceivably address. In other words, using corporate 
structure to solve problems along one dimension comes at the expense of not solving problems 
along other dimensions. Such trade-offs can be addressed by complex matrix structures, but they 
are difficult to implement and maintain (Galbraith, 2008; vis & Lawrence, 1977).4 The result of 
this trade-off between the benefits and limitations of homogeneous and heterogeneous units 
tends to be an unbalanced – but not extreme – interaction structure. At the corporate level, such 
design choices often yield a hybrid structure that contains some product- and market-based units 
in addition to some global functional units. 
Reorganizations and Interaction Structure 
These trade-offs between different interaction structures have implications for the dynamic 
context of reorganizations. It is well known that implementing a new structure takes time. During 
a reorganization, employees must modify their behavior to accommodate new processes, 
incentives, and lines of reporting (Anderson & Lewis, 2014). The result is an adjustment lag 
between the reorganization’s rollout and the time when top management can finally observe 
some results from implementing the new structure (Lamont et al., 1994; Miller & Friesen, 
1983).5 During this initial implementation phase, the new structure’s benefits increase over time. 
Only after employees have adjusted their behavior to the new interaction structure – and 
abandoned their old ways of “getting things done” – can the new structure finally exhibit its 
 
4 The challenges of implementing and maintaining a matrix structure reflect the demands it places on employees. 
Given their limited resources (e.g., time, cognitive capacity, budget) and in light of strong social factors (e.g., power, 
career aspirations, favors) affecting their choices, employees are more productive if they report to just one or at most 
two supervisors (Ford & Randolph, 1992; Joyce, 1986). 
5 A caveat to this generalization is that some cost-cutting measures (such as closing down or spinning off entire 
business lines) will take effect almost immediately. Although corporate-level reorganizations may include such 
actions, they are not limited to changes of that type. 
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desired effects. It is by considering this adjustment lag that my study of the interaction structure 
(i.e., independent of the decision-making locus) can develop novel insights. 
There are, in particular, two outcomes that result from employees adjusting their behavior 
to the current structure: (1) the targeted challenges and goals are resolved and achieved; and 
(2) problems not properly addressed by the current structure are shifted into the foreground. 
Hence the opportunity costs of adopting this particular structure become more apparent over 
time. Since changing the firm’s structure is both costly and disruptive (a fixed cost), it follows 
that firms will reorganize only after encountering a new design challenge with which the current 
interaction structure is incapable of dealing. Suppose, for example, that the structure in Figure 2 
were adopted in order to cut costs by merging all R&D units into a single global laboratory. This 
change would reduce the total number of employees and facilities needed and so would lower 
operational overhead – benefits that can be achieved over some initial time period.  
The new structure would incentivize the R&D team to develop innovations that could be 
applied across the firm’s various product lines. Although the firm might eventually lag behind its 
competition in, say, cutting-edge cell-phone features (the opportunity costs of any current 
structure become apparent as time passes), this problem could be remedied by isolating R&D 
efforts in a product-based unit focused on cell phones. That solution would be adopted when the 
potential benefits of adopting it (minus the reorganization costs) start to outweigh the current 
structure’s benefits. This example illustrates that the firm did not simply “get it wrong” when 
implementing the global R&D unit, since doing so was an effective cost-cutting solution and 
served the firm well for an extended period. Yet after that goal was achieved, new problems 
(here, a lack of cell-phone innovation) moved to the foreground. The revised structure’s inability 
to address that development guided the choice of the next reorganization’s interaction structure, 
which in this case was a shift toward units that were more heterogeneous. 
More generally, we can view organization design i (ODi) as having a benefit function that 
increases at first but then plateaus quickly as the opportunity costs of maintaining design i 
increase with time. This design’s cost–benefit function is plotted in Figure 3. Suppose that the 
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benefits of adopting a different design j at time tj are denoted bj, and let ri, j denote the fixed cost 
of reorganizing from i to j. Then the next reorganization is expected to occur at time t*, which is 
when the benefits of design j minus the fixed reorganization costs ri, j intersect the cost–benefit 
function of organization design i. Only if the different designs have these general properties 
should one expect repeated reorganizations to constitute an equilibrium. 
[[ INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Because the interaction structures of homogeneous and heterogeneous units are 
complementary, firms can be expected to shift their focus between more homogeneous and more 
heterogeneous interaction structures over time. The reason is simply that structures with a greater 
homogeneous focus can solve problems that a structure with a greater heterogeneous focus 
cannot – and vice versa. Thus my first hypotheses can be formally stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). A greater proportion of homogenous units in the firm’s current structure 
is associated with a shift toward more heterogeneous units in its next reorganization. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). A greater proportion of heterogeneous units in the firm’s current 
structure is associated with a shift toward more homogeneous units in its next reorganization. 
Although these reorganizations appear to shift the firm’s focus back and forth between 
more homogeneous and more heterogeneous interaction structures, this pattern does not imply 
that firms fail to learn. An important implication of studying a firm’s interaction structure is the 
ability to “unravel” the actual designs adopted. Thus we can see that firms’ structures, despite 
tending to shift between different foci, progress over time. It is in this context where the 
distinction between interaction structures and locus of decision making power allows for more 
nuances. For example, a firm that shifts from a greater focus on heterogeneous units to adopting 
more homogeneous units and then to adopting more heterogeneous units in the next 
reorganization would likely be classified as shifting from decentralization to centralization and 
then back to decentralization. In contrast, studying the interaction structures presents this pattern 
as an indication that the firm is focusing on different challenges. 
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The firm’s initial focus on heterogeneous units may have reflected, for instance, a 
perceived need for greater market responsiveness that led to creating a product unit dedicated 
solely to cell phones. That change might be followed by a perceived need to reduce costs and 
hence by the creation of a global R&D unit (i.e., shifting toward a more homogeneous focus), 
which could be followed in turn by the addition of a market-based unit for China – that is, to 
address insufficient responsiveness in tailoring products to suit that growing market (i.e., now 
shifting toward a more heterogeneous focus). The crucial point here is that, even though both the 
first and third structure involve shifts toward a more heterogeneous focus, they each change the 
firm’s strategic focus by moving it in different directions. Thus a pattern of apparent reversals is 
more accurately viewed as indicative of the firm’s active learning: exploiting the benefits and 
shortcomings of different interaction structures. 
Implications for the Timing of Reorganizations 
My focus on interaction structure and its effect on reorganizations presents the opportunity to 
generate additional insights. Suppose an interaction structure is truly driving the shifts between a 
greater focus on homogeneous and heterogeneous business units; then it should matter who is 
grouped together in the business unit. I posit that different interaction structures systematically 
generate adjustment lags of different lengths, a dynamic that bears implications for the next 
reorganization’s expected timing as a function of the firm’s current interaction structure. 
I have mentioned that employees do not adjust their behavior immediately after a 
reorganization is announced (Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2003; Lamont et al., 1994). In fact, such 
an announcement is but the first step in surmounting the challenge or achieving the goal that 
management seeks to address. But what, exactly, does it mean for a reorganization to be 
“implemented”? Apart from drawing up the new interaction structure, managing the logistics of 
moving employees into their new units, and revising the organization chart with all its 
implications (e.g., establishing new reporting and remuneration paths, disseminating information 
about the changes), it is the behavior of employees in solving their tasks – including whom they 
approach to collaborate with – that must reflect the changed corporate structure if the 
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reorganization is to have its desired effect. Employees are grouped into the same unit so as to 
facilitate the communication and coordination of their activities by aligning their incentives with 
common organizational subgoals (at the unit level) and by enabling the interactions necessary for 
effective collaboration. However, these outcomes will not be observed until employees have at 
least partially adjusted their information processing patterns to the new structure.6 
Suppose that employees are identical – in other words, that all employees have the same 
background and expertise. Then the duration of their adjustment process (i.e., before a 
reorganization yields visible effects) should not vary with the type of new interaction structure 
implemented. This is the baseline assumption in prior work (Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2002). Recall, however, that organizational behavior scholars have described how 
employees dedicated to different organizational functions (e.g., scientists in an R&D unit, 
salespersons in a global sales office) differ in their approach to tasks and in their interpretation of 
the environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dougherty, 1992; Joyce, 
1986). 
If we take as given these fundamental differences in how employees perceive problems 
and approach tasks, then employees in homogeneous units (grouped with others of the same 
functional background) can be expected to adjust their behavior more rapidly than do employees 
in heterogeneous units (grouped with others who have distinct functional backgrounds). When an 
employee is grouped with others of the same type (say, engineers), it is likely that they all share 
the same “thought world” (Dougherty, 1992) and hence should encounter fewer “representational 
gaps” (Cronin & Weingart, 2007). These claims are illustrated by the extent of overlap in the 
Venn diagram of Figure 2’s panel (a). Yet if the same employee is grouped with employees of 
other types (e.g., engineers, salespersons, procurement managers), then the extent to which they 
all share a common knowledge base will be considerably less; see the Venn diagram in panel (b) 
 
6 Research has addressed the limitations of this behavioral adjustment as well as its time lag, and scholars have 
shown that its effects may be both beneficial or detrimental to the firm (Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Lamont et al., 
1994; Miller & Friesen, 1983; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; Soda & Zaheer, 2012). 
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of the figure. It follows that the types of units into which employees are grouped should strongly 
affect how rapidly they achieve effective collaboration. 
Shifting focus now to the corporate level, and thus aggregating upward the interaction 
structure’s effects, I have argued that two outcomes are likely once employees adjust their 
behavior and information processing patterns to the new structure: (1) the reorganization’s 
purposes are achieved; and (2) new problems become more prominent that the now-current 
structure cannot address satisfactorily. One factor with a strong effect on these two outcomes is 
how long it takes employees to adjust their behavior and information processing patterns to the 
new interaction structure. If the firm’s corporate structure contains many homogeneous units, 
then the employees in those units learn to collaborate effectively within a relatively short period 
of time. In that event, the firm – as compared to the case of many heterogeneous units – should 
not only (1) achieve its reorganization purposes relatively sooner but also (2) advance more 
quickly on addressing problems that the current structure is insufficient to address. These 
differences in the adjustment time required to achieve effective information processing and 
collaboration imply that heterogeneous units require more time to be implemented (e.g., 
employees must lay more groundwork before collaborating with dissimilar than with similar 
colleagues).7 With regard to the costs–benefit function plotted in Figure 3, this argument 
translates into a function (for designs with homogeneous interaction structures) that at first rises 
steeply but then reaches an inflection point sooner than would a design with a heterogeneous 
interaction structure. Although other factors may contribute to this theorized effect, my core 
argument is that the firm’s present interaction structure has a systematic yet asymmetric effect on 
the timing of the next reorganization. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). A greater proportion of heterogeneous units in the firm’s current structure 
is associated with a longer delay until the next reorganization occurs. 
 
7 It is also possible that heterogeneous units are better (than are homogeneous units) at addressing a broader range of 
goals and challenges, an advantage that may contribute to the observed timing asymmetry with respect to unit type. 
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b). A greater proportion of homogeneous units in the firm’s current structure 
is associated with a shorter delay until the next reorganization occurs. 
There are three benefits to developing these additional insights. First, it showcases my 
proposed mechanism’s generative power and highlights the importance of connecting the micro 
and macro levels of analysis when exploring the richness of the reorganization phenomenon. 
Second, it enables a critical experiment for testing the posited micro mechanism against the null 
hypothesis that the apparent reversals are simply driven by regression to the mean. If I do find 
support for H2a and H2b both, then the existence of timing asymmetry would indicate that this 
mechanism is indeed more likely at play than is regression to the mean (since the latter does not 
predict asymmetric timing). Third, Hypotheses 2 lend additional backing to my claim that each 
reorganization signifies both progress and managerial learning. So when firms adopt a structure 
with a more heterogeneous focus, a consistent delay should occur only when that structure is 
novel to the firm; that is, there should be no delay if the same structure were being re-adopted. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Description 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested on the global cell-phone manufacturing industry. There are five 
reasons why this industry is especially well suited to examining my research question. First, the 
consumer cell-phone industry is relatively young (it has existed only since 1983) and therefore 
allows one to collect reorganization data from its inception. Second, since the industry comprises 
relatively few players, I was able to collect data on nearly the entire population of firms. Third, 
this industry allows for the testing of multiple reorganizations per firm over time – a vital feature 
because I require a setting in which the mechanism is clearly manifest. Fourth, the focal 
companies are all in the same industry; hence I can ensure a relatively controlled organizational 
environment because all firms experience the same type and timing of significant environmental 
events. Fifth, homogeneous units map nicely onto functional units, as do heterogeneous units 
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onto product and market units. So for this industry I can use functional and product/market units 
as proxies for homogeneous and heterogeneous interaction structures. 
The study’s sample consists of 1,621 firm–quarter-year observations of 34 firms over the 
25-year period from 1983 through 2008, and it contains 102 corporate-level reorganizations.8 
Note that the panel is unbalanced owing to the entry and exit of firms during the period under 
observation. The sample selection process began with Gartner’s list of firms having the highest 
market share in 2008 and was supplemented by searches on Hoover’s, the website of GSM (a 
standard-setting body), and the World Wide Web to capture all major cell-phone manufacturers. 
In addition to tracking the 21 firms identified in 2008 back to their founding (or to their entry 
into the cell-phone manufacturing market), I conducted this same search for each year from 2008 
to 1983. The final sample contains firms that held a combined global market share exceeding 
99% in 2008 and in all previous years – a total of 34 manufacturers. The other 1% consists of 
firms (most of which were located in China during the study’s time frame) that specialize in 
replicating other firms’ phones to sell locally; my study excludes such firms because I could find 
no viable data for them. Hence the results reported here do not pertain to all firms in the Chinese 
cell-phone manufacturing segment. A single-industry setting allows me to control for changes in 
the external environment that similarly affect all firms in the sample; the downside of this 
approach is that it results in a relatively small sample size. I address that issue by using two 
different regression models to test each hypothesis. Although a larger number of events would 
naturally be preferable, I believe that the greater control allowed by this single-industry study 
can establish effects that could be subsequently tested in studies covering more industries. 
Reorganization-level data. These data were manually collected from trade press and 
newspaper articles accessed via Factiva. Those data sources were supplemented by annual 
reports, companies’ websites, press releases, and analyst reports. For each corporate-level 
reorganization I used these data to match its announcement date, the name and description of the 
 
8 Two of these firms did not report any corporate-level reorganizations during the time period and so were omitted 
from the fixed-effects models. 
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top-level business units before the reorganization, and the name and description of the new 
structure’s units (i.e., after the reorganization). I then used those descriptions to code the old and 
new business units as being based on products, markets, or functions (Fligstein, 1985; Williams 
& Mitchell, 2004). 
By collecting data on the old and new business units surrounding each reorganization 
announcement, I ensured data collection on all corporate-level reorganizations. For example, 
reports on the first reorganization by Motorola after 1983 described the different business units 
constituting the structure prior to the change as well as those of the newly adopted structure. 
Articles discussing Motorola’s next reorganization again described its current structure, which 
allowed me to ensure that no reorganization was missed – that is, because the second 
reorganization’s “old” structure coincided with the first reorganization’s “new” structure. 
For conglomerates, I collected data on the subsidiary responsible for cell-phone 
manufacturing activities; so in the case of Samsung Co., for instance, I collected data on the 
reorganizations undertaken by Samsung Electronics.9 
I gathered 50–100 articles for each reorganization to obtain a rich description of every 
business unit’s primary purpose. This information allowed me to “distill” each unit’s interaction 
structure: whether it grouped employees into a homogeneous unit (such as global R&D or sales) 
or into a heterogeneous unit (such as cell-phones or North America).10 Although corporate-level 
reorganizations might change only a few business units, the resulting structural shifts are still 
disruptive and strategically important. I focus on corporate-level changes to ensure that 
reorganizations were indeed significant for the organization as a whole. For example, a change in 
just one business unit at the bottom of the hierarchy will hardly be noticed by most individuals in 
the corporation. Yet a change in just one top-level product unit will affect the entire section of 
 
9 A second coder (who was blind to the study) was also tasked with the reorganization coding. For a subsample of 
firms, this second coder also collected relevant data to ensure that no information had been overlooked. There was 
no disagreement – with regard to either the collection or coding of data – as a function of coder identity, which 
confirms the straightforward nature of assigning business units to the categories I used. 
10 Examples of the coding procedure are given in the Online Supplementary Material. 
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that business – that is, at each hierarchical level below the corporate one – as well as the 
functional and market units to which the focal unit is interconnected through hybrid or matrix 
structures (see Hannan et al., 2003). When Motorola merged just two business units in 2006, for 
instance, the reorganization “involve[d] nearly 50 percent of the company’s nearly 70,000 
employees.”11 So even though many reorganizations may appear to be small, they can have a 
substantial impact on the firm. 
Firm- and industry-level data. Performance measures and numbers of employees were 
obtained from Compustat and Datastream and were complemented by information derived from 
annual reports. Those reports were also my source for information on the year of founding, year 
of entry into the cell-phone market, and extent of diversification of the firm (or its relevant 
subsidiary). Data on CEO changes were collected via Factiva using a method similar to that 
employed for reorganization data, and the industry’s number of reorganizations was inferred 
from the reorganization-level data. In addition, I tracked firm entry and exit to capture the 
industry’s number of active competitors. 
[[ INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Figure 4 (top panel) plots all reorganizations in this sector from the industry’s inception 
in 1983 to the end of data collection in December 2008. This figure includes the total number of 
active firms – and the number of exits from the industry – for each year. Note that there are many 
reorganizations coinciding with the dot-com crash of 2001 and with the iPhone launch and 
subprime mortgage crisis in 2007; also, the number of active firms declined during the economic 
downturn in 2008. Hence it is clear that external events play a role in the overall pattern of 
reorganizations. The question that I address is whether (or not) internal factors are also important 
enough to influence these reorganization decisions, their direction, and their timing. 
 
11 CMP TechWeb, “Motorola Merges Two Businesses Units” (3 March 2006); for more details, see the Online 
Supplementary Material. 
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Measures 
Dependent variables. I test Hypotheses 1a and 1b by way of a dichotomous measure of the 
probability that a reorganization ran counter to the firm’s current structure. Thus, for every 
reorganization I code the relative increase and decrease in homogeneous and heterogeneous 
units. A reorganizing firm that increases its number of homogeneous units and/or reduces its 
number of heterogeneous units is coded as a shift toward greater homogeneity (H1a). 
Conversely, a firm that increases its number of heterogeneous units and/or reduces its number of 
homogeneous units is coded as a shift toward greater heterogeneity (H1b).12 The two types of 
shifts for the industry are plotted by year in Figure 4 (bottom panel). I test Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
by using a count measure of the number of days between reorganizations. 
Independent variables. The independent variable is the proportion of homogeneous (or 
heterogeneous) units. For every structure adopted, I code the number of homogeneous and 
heterogeneous units and then calculate, as just described, the proportion of the focal structure’s 
homogeneous (or heterogeneous) units.13 
Control variables. These variables were chosen specifically to control for reorganization 
triggers frequently identified in the literature. Unless stated otherwise, all control variables are 
lagged by one year relative to the focal reorganization. I control for Change in CEO, an event 
commonly associated with changes in strategy; this dichotomous variable captures whether (or 
not) a CEO change occurred during the 12 months prior to reorganization (cf. (Chandler, 
1962)).14 I also control for the firm’s number of rivals in order to capture changes in the 
 
12 There were four reorganizations that left the structural emphasis unchanged – for example, a shift from three 
homogeneous and three heterogeneous units to four homogeneous and four heterogeneous units. For these cases, 
I inspected the raw data to discern the strategic shift that accompanied the announcement and then coded the 
reorganizations accordingly. I also tested for whether omitting those observations affected the results (it did not). 
13 Since each of these measures is the other’s inverse, I report results only for the proportion of homogeneous units. 
It would be preferable to count the number of employees who are grouped into homogeneous versus heterogeneous 
units, but unit-level employee data were not available. 
14 Changes in the head of the business unit responsible for the cell-phone product line would be a more direct proxy 
for leadership influence. Yet because the data set was international and ranged widely in time, we were not able to 
obtain information related to this variable for most of the sample. 
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competitive environment. In addition, I control for company Age and Degree of diversification 
(at the time of the reorganization) because research in corporate strategy (Chandler, 1962) and 
life-cycle theory (Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Quinn & Cameron, 1983) suggests that larger 
companies are less likely to adopt a purely homogeneous structure and also that age is correlated 
with more complex organizational structures (e.g., divisional, multi-divisional, matrix).  
To see whether companies tend to imitate the reorganization behavior of other firms in 
their sector (cf. (Haveman, 1993)), I control for the number of reorganizations in the cell-phone 
manufacturing industry by their type: the variables Industry hom shifts and Industry het shifts 
represent the count, in a given year, of reorganizations shifting the firm toward (respectively) a 
more homogeneous or heterogeneous focus (see bottom panel of Figure 4). To control for firm 
performance, I follow (Audia & Greve, 2006) and use Return on assets. Finally, I include the 
rationale given – in official announcements – for each reorganization in order to control for 
sequential attention being paid to competing goals (Cyert & March, 1963). For every 
reorganization, the firm releases information about its purpose (e.g., “to improve efficiency”); 
I coded these rationales either as “cost efficiency” or as “market responsiveness” and then set the 
binary indicator Competing rationales to 1 (resp., to 0) if the subsequent reorganization had 
(resp., did not have) a contrary rationale. 
[[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and the piecewise correlation matrix for all variables; 
as expected, the coefficients are relatively high for the firm- and industry-level reorganization 
measures. There are missing values for two types of variables: the lagged independent variables 
(one observation per firm is lost because of the lag structure) and return on assets (ROA), my 
proxy for performance.15 Of the sample’s 102 reorganizations, 47% (resp., 53%) shifted the 
firm’s focus toward more homogeneous (resp., more heterogeneous) units. 
 
15 The main models include ROA because performance plays a crucial role in reorganization decisions. Because 
Compustat and Datastream could provide only incomplete ROA data, I hand-collected as many missing values as 
possible through annual reports. 
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Model Specification: Type of Change 
The dependent variable for testing the type of change across reorganizations is a dichotomous 
measure; hence I use a panel logit model with fixed effects to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
A fixed-effects model should help control for some alternative explanations that are difficult to 
assess using my data – provided that these factors do not change over time. Examples include the 
extent to which reorganizations are driven by politics, collaboration, or feedback (Cyert & 
March, 1963). 
Model Specification: Timing of Change 
The dependent variable that I use to test the timing effect on reorganizations is a count measure; 
therefore, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested via a panel Poisson model with fixed effects and 
robust standard errors (SEs).16 The data’s structure precluded running a standard Hausman test to 
confirm that using fixed effects was appropriate. However, running Stata’s xtoverid command 
yields support for the fixed-effects model in that the random-effects coefficients are equivalent to 
those derived from a pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression; note also that fixed-effects 
models limit the bias due to omitted variables. All analyses were run in Stata (version 15.1). 
 
RESULTS 
Type of Reorganizations 
Table 2 presents results of the fixed-effects logit regressions used to test for whether a firm’s 
current structure affects the type of structure chosen in its next reorganization. I find that a 
greater proportion of homogeneous units in the current structure increases the probability of a 
countering reorganization – that is, one toward more heterogeneous units ( β = 3.899,  p < 0.01, 
Model 6); a greater proportion of heterogeneous units in the current structure likewise increases 
 
16 Notwithstanding the data’s overdisperson, I follow the literature in disregarding the negative binomial model 
because estimating it is not a true fixed-effects procedure in Stata. In fact, there is widespread support for using 
panel Poisson models in such cases (see (Wooldridge, 1999). 
 22 
the probability of a countering reorganization toward more homogeneous units ( β = 5.23,  p < 
0.01, Model 4, [(-1)*β]). These results support Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
[[ INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ]] 
The impact of these relationships is considerable: an increase of one homogeneous unit in 
the old structure increases the likelihood of a countering reorganization by a factor of 3.9 while 
reducing the likelihood of a shift in the same direction (toward a more homogeneous structure) 
by a factor of 5.2. My study’s independent variable is constructed such that the converse 
relationship holds: an increase of one heterogeneous unit increases the likelihood of a countering 
reorganization by a factor of 5.2 while reducing the likelihood of a shift in the same direction 
(here, toward a more heterogenous structure) by a factor of 3.9. These findings are robust to 
using a panel OLS regression with either random or fixed effects; results for the latter are 
reported in Models 7 and 8 of Table 2 (all OLS models are available in Table 2A in the Online 
Supplementary Material). 
Timing of Reorganizations 
In Table 3, Models 1 and 2 present results of the fixed-effects Poisson regressions used to test for 
whether the firm’s current structure affects the timing of subsequent reorganizations. I find that 
the greater the proportion of homogeneous units in the firm’s current structure, the sooner (i.e., 
fewer days until) the next reorganization occurs ( β = −1.711,  p = 0.027); conversely, the greater 
the proportion of heterogeneous units in the firm’s current structure, the longer (i.e., more days) 
until the next reorganization ( β = 1.711,  p = 0.027). These results, too, are robust to using a 
panel OLS regression with random or fixed effects; the fixed-effects model’s results are reported 
in Models 3 and 4 of Table 3. 
[[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Robustness Checks 
My findings are robust to a variety of models and specifications. I conducted event history 
analyses using both parametric and nonparametric hazard models (while using time interactions 
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for H2). Across those alternative specifications, both the direction and significance of the 
hypothesized predictors are consistent with the findings already reported. These results hold also 
when I use a different coding approach – the total count of units of different types – for the 
independent variables. I also tested for timing asymmetry (H2) while using relative shift toward 
homogeneous (heterogeneous) as the dependent variables, thereby accounting for the oscillation 
described in the extant literature; my results continue to hold. 
In addition, I ran these and the previously described models with the following additional 
control variables.17 (1) Mergers between cell-phone manufacturers arguably change the 
competitive landscape, which may induce reorganizations by affected (and other) players; 
however, controlling for mergers (for the firm that merged and also for the industry’s number of 
mergers) has no significant effect on other variables or on the results. (2) Controlling for two 
“game-changing” events – the 2001 dot-com crash and  2007 subprime mortgage crisis/ Apple’s 
iPhone announcement – does not affect the observed direction or rate of change. (3) Controlling 
for whether a firm’s current structure was a matrix organization has no appreciable effect on the 
direction or rate of change. (4) Finally, I established that different types of conglomerates 
(chaebols, keiretsu, and Western style) were structured in much the same way. This result was 
derived by running regressions that excluded each type (separately and jointly) and then 
confirming that the results were unchanged and remained significant. 
Alternative Explanations 
Is the reversal in reorganization types driven by regression to the mean? Regression to the 
mean is an alternative explanation for the tendency of subsequent reorganizations to shift the 
firm away from, rather than to deepen, its current focus. In particular, if one assumes that the 
choice of new structure is independent of the firm’s current structure, then successive 
reorganizations can be viewed as independent draws of new structures from a given distribution 
whose mean is unknown and may change over time. So if the choice of structure in 
 
17 These regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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reorganization rt  is far to the right of the true mean of structures (i.e., in a graph of the 
distribution) then the next structure chosen, rt+1, will likely be closer to the mean – that is, to the 
left of rt . A shift away from the current focus will occur if the subsequent choice of new 
structure, rt+2 , lies between the first two choices. In organization theory, regression to the mean 
can often explain phenomena that exhibit reversal tendencies (Greve, 1999). The essential 
difference with respect to my theory-driven account of successive reorganizations is that I have 
no reason to believe that the pattern of regressing to the mean will continue indefinitely or even 
beyond a single instance; yet under regression to the mean, the choice of structure approaches the 
true mean as time t approaches infinity. The number of reorganizations per firm in my sample, 
while sizeable, is too small to reject the Null Hypothesis that regression to the mean could 
reasonably account for the patterns described in Hypotheses 1; however, it cannot explain the 
heterogeneous–homogeneous asymmetry implied by the evidence for H2a and H2b because 
regression to the mean would predict no relationship between the timing of reorganizations and 
the firm’s current structure. Hence I conclude that the theory-driven explanation is more likely 
(i.e., than is regression to the mean) behind the pattern of reorganizations observed in these data. 
Is the asymmetry in the timing of reorganizations driven by more rapid (or 
instantaneous) goal achievement in organizations with a homogeneous interaction structure? 
Suppose, for example, that a CEO moves away from a homogeneous interaction structure more 
quickly because her aim in adopting the former in the first place was to cut costs, which can be 
achieved instantaneously by laying off part of the workforce. To test the validity of this 
explanation, I control for layoffs that are associated with the reorganization (see Online 
Supplementary Material, Table 4, Model 1). For this purpose I use a dichotomous variable 
capturing whether layoffs were announced in the three (six) months before and after a 
reorganization’s announcement and/or implementation; this variable indicates whether (or not) 
the focal reorganization was accompanied by layoffs. I find that controlling for layoffs changes 
neither the coefficients nor the significance of results reported previously. Cost-cutting attempts 
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are also captured by coding the official reasons given for reorganization, which often include 
cost cutting and other forms of “rationalization”; the results from these regressions are presented 
in Model 2 of Table 4 (Online Supplementary Material). Once again, my findings continue to 
hold. Hence this alternative explanation seems unable to account for the asymmetry result. 
Is the asymmetry in the rate of change an artefact of the coding method? It is worth 
noting that there are more categories of heterogeneous units (i.e., product and market) than of 
homogeneous units (i.e., function), which means that firms may have fewer options when 
looking to emphasize a homogeneous focus. If one views the choice of structure as a random 
walk on a landscape whose peaks represent structures with a predominantly homogeneous or 
predominantly heterogeneous focus, then the concern articulated here would translate into a 
greater number of heterogeneous peaks. So suppose that reorganizations occur at a constant rate 
and that, for every reorganization, a new peak is chosen at random. In this scenario, there will 
necessarily be more switches away from heterogeneous structures than from homogeneous ones. 
Hence my finding of asymmetry might be more reflective of structural availability than of 
asymmetry in the respective adjustment lags. 
One way to address this issue is to limit the structural choices to just two categories; in 
that case, the structural availability argument should predict that the time elapsed to the next 
reorganization will not vary as a function of the old structure’s type. In contrast, my theory 
predicts that the time spent in a predominantly functional structure (before it switches to a 
predominantly product-based one) is much shorter than the time spent in a predominantly 
product-based structure (before it switches to a predominantly functional one). I test this 
prediction by calculating the ratio of product-based units to all units; the results confirm H2a 
( β = 1.594, SE = 0.802,  p = 0.047).18 
 
18 As a further test of this alternative explanation, I split the heterogeneous units into their product and market 
components and then run the Poisson regressions using three independent variables. I find that neither the market–
product comparisons nor the market–function comparisons are significant, which is not surprising when one 
considers the limited number of shifts that involve market units. And despite the firm’s high number of product 
units, there are not many within-firm differences from one reorganization to the next; hence it seems there is not 
enough variation for these effects to show up in a fixed-effects model. However, shifts from product to function do 
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Is the asymmetry driven by differences in the logistical difficulty of creating a new 
homogeneous unit versus a new heterogeneous one? For example, adding a new market unit 
(heterogeneous unit) entails a substantial investment whereas adding a new global R&D unit 
(homogeneous unit) may be easier for the organization. This alternative explanation could drive 
the asymmetry result if (a) many of the reorganizations that shift a firm toward more 
heterogeneous units were the result of newly created markets or products while (b) the 
reorganizations that shift a firm toward more homogeneous units were simply recombinations of 
existing units. In order to test this hypothesis, I coded the origin of each new unit that was 
involved in each reorganization. It turns out that the reorganizations observed in this sample are 
exclusively recombinations; upon reflection, this should not be surprising because I focus on top-
level units. That is, a new product line or market is likely to be first developed at a lower level of 
the hierarchy before being “promoted” to a position near the top of that hierarchy. The results for 
this sample of firms are therefore not driven by the relative difficulty of creating homogeneous 
versus heterogeneous units. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of this research is to examine the effect of a firm’s current structure on the type and 
timing of its reorganizations. In particular, I explore whether there are systematic patterns 
whereby certain types of structure are followed by others and then examine how structure type 
affects the timing of a subsequent reorganization. I find that (1) successive reorganizations tend 
to shift away from the current interaction structure and (2) that the current type of interaction 
structure affects the timing of the next reorganization. These results underscore the significant 
influence of internal structure on the direction and timing of a firm’s reorganization. 
This paper deepens our theoretical understanding of organization design – more 
specifically, the mechanism by which a firm’s current structure influences reorganization. Since 
 
have the anticipated positive effect: firms take longer to the next shift towards functional units if their current 
structure is product-based. 
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employees are presumed to approach challenges and tasks from their individual perspectives, 
which are strongly affected by their specialization and socialization vis-à-vis a particular firm 
function (Dougherty, 1992), it follows that interesting comparative predictions can be derived 
about the timing of different types of reorganizations. I propose that the way employees are 
grouped into different kinds of units may have implications for efficiency in that certain 
groupings accelerate collaboration among employees, resulting in their more rapid behavioral 
adjustment to the new structure. Hence grouping employees into homogeneous units based on 
shared activities and similar backgrounds should facilitate collaboration whereas grouping 
employees into heterogeneous units comprising individuals of different backgrounds and 
specializations can be expected to delay effective collaboration. I test these theoretical arguments 
empirically and find directional support for the macro-level effects anticipated if this micro 
mechanism does indeed influence the adjustment process between reorganizations. I find that 
firms shift away significantly more quickly from a homogeneous focus than from a 
heterogeneous one. 
My second contribution to the reorganization literature is the emphasis on managerial 
learning in this pattern of reorganizations. By adopting a multi-dimensional concept of 
organization design and by focusing not on a firm’s locus of decision making but rather on the 
interaction structure of its business units, I highlight how each is, in effect, a step toward a new 
design. 
The confirmed systematic and ongoing shift away from a firm’s current interaction 
structure – and the role that different types of structure play in such shifts – bear important 
implications for empirical studies of reorganization and for the development of pertinent theory. 
The empirical results reported here identify a source of variation that could explain the difficulty 
encountered, in the extant literature based on cross-sectional data, when attempting to document 
the effects of certain relevant contingency factors (see e.g. (Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990). In 
terms of a theoretical understanding of reorganizations, my study supports the viability of 
(Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2005) suggestion that scholars investigate the organization’s past if 
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they seek a true understanding of the full range of factors that affect the outcome of any given 
reorganization. By establishing that different types of reorganizations can be usefully 
distinguished by their interaction structures and by generating testable predictions that concern 
the rate of reorganizations, this paper promotes a closer examination of the reorganization 
process per se and also answers (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2005)’s call to explore how 
reorganization is influenced by the type of structure a firm is changing from and moving toward. 
More broadly, the findings reported here have noteworthy theoretical implications also 
for the organization design literature. When one observes misalignment between a firm’s 
structure and its environment, the standard approach is to determine which new design would 
best suit the new set of “contingencies” (Donaldson, 2001). Here I revisit the importance of 
viewing each design problem as a re-design problem. At a superficial level, the implication is 
that this design issue is strongly affected by the firm’s current structure. At a more fundamental 
level, this view implies that two firms facing the same exogenous shift in the environment may 
adopt different but equally effective new designs. Such “equifinality” – rather than merely 
marking the efficiency frontier of different structural options available to address any given 
environmental condition (Gresov & Drazin, 1997) – may also reflect the respective firms’ 
different structural starting points and thereby indicate the new structures needed to address a 
changed environment. In other words, the internal structure itself helps determine which new 
structure is the best response to a new environmental contingency. 
One limitation of this paper is that the data do not allow for a direct test of the 
mechanism I propose as underlying the rate of reorganizations. Although several alternative 
explanations can be rejected after testing with the available data, additional research is needed to 
explore the micro level of this mechanism and to verify its operation. At the very least, my 
finding of asymmetry in the timing of reorganizations – that is, their dependence on the 
interaction structure of a firm’s current structure – reveals that distinguishing between different 
types of (current and subsequent) structures is more than a mere footnote to established 
interpretations of this phenomenon. Rather, such distinctions should alter the way these strategic 
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decisions are studied in light of my demonstration that they figure prominently as drivers of 
reorganization and as a means to affect both the direction and timing of such change. 
Another limitation is that, although I control for performance, I do not thoroughly 
investigate the performance implications (or strategic drivers) of the different types of change. 
Such investigation was beyond the scope of this research; in any case, pursuing that line of 
inquiry would be a challenge given the likely correlation between (a) change types’ differences 
in focus and (b) strategic choices related to cost-cutting versus revenue growth. A third limitation 
of the study is its focus on a single industry, which reduces the generalizability of my findings. 
Yet given the anecdotal evidence for oscillation in reorganizations in diverse other industries, 
this study’s empirical support for such a pattern is a good foundation for related investigations of 
those other industries. Finally, knowledge-intensive (service) firms may well have relatively 
more homogeneous workforces than do manufacturing firms. Future research could profitably 
assess the extent to which the principles developed here apply in knowledge-based sectors. 
Given the extensive published results on the external triggers of reorganization, it is high time for 
scholars to focus on the micro-level mechanisms of this process and to see whether these 
findings can be replicated in sectors that are less turbulent and/or more knowledge intensive. 
A practical implication of my results is that inter-unit linking mechanisms, such as cross-
functional teams and information technologies that promote communication across unit 
boundaries, are likely to be embraced more enthusiastically if the current structure is extremely 
heterogeneous. These work practices aim to enhance collaboration across units, and I theorize 
that such practices should reduce the correlation between the speed of achieving collaboration 
and the need for structural change. With the aid of such boundary-spanning technologies, a 
reorganization could serve to encourage new links between employees without necessarily 
weakening the links that already exist. When a reorganization is initiated under these 
circumstances, employees are likely to have a comparatively larger set of pre-existing links to 
colleagues in their new unit – links that should accelerate the process of adjustment. 
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In addition, my findings have practical implications for the organization design literature. 
Those who are tasked with managing a reorganization must attend to the interaction structure not 
only of the new design but also of the current one; if either of these aspects is ignored, then 
unexpected (and probably undesired) consequences could arise upon implementation. Awareness 
of the interactions between the old and new types of structure is indispensable if the goal is to 
ensure a successful reorganization. 
I have established empirically that the firm’s current structure is itself a key determinant 
of reorganizations (i.e., beyond the external factors already known to affect such decisions). The 
finding that the current interaction structure influences the type of structure subsequently adopted 
accords with the extant literature on centralization and decentralization; however, it is by 
showing how these factors affect the timing of the next reorganization that I (a) contribute novel 
theoretical insights to the literatures on reorganization and organization design and (b) emphasize 
the need to study interaction structures. I argue that the grouping of employees into units with 
different interaction structures has far-reaching implications for efficiency. I also posit that 
certain groupings accelerate collaboration among affected employees and so result in a more 
rapid adjustment of their behavior to the new structure. In this way, the research reported here 
extends our understanding of organization design by showing how a firm’s current structure 
influences employees’ interaction structure and, as a result, both the type and timing of the firm’s 
next reorganization. 
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Figure 1: Interactions, interaction structures, and organization design 
 
 
Figure 2: Hybrid structure and employees’ knowledge overlap by type of unit 
 
This figure depicts a typical hybrid structure and the interaction structures for 
different types of units. The expertise overlap among employees within a business 
unit is illustrated in panel (a) for a group of three strongly similar employees and 
in panel (b) for a group of three highly dissimilar employees. 
 
 
  
This figure illustrates the six possible two-way 
interactions among four employees within an 
organization. There are far more possible interaction 
structures (64) than the three usually considered in 
the field of organization design: functional or 
divisional form, or their interaction in a matrix 
structure. 
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Figure 3: Cost–benefit function of organization design and reorganizations 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Cell-phone manufacturing firms and their reorganizations 
 
 
 
 
The blue line plots the combined 
cost–benefit function of the firm’s 
current organization design (OD1), 
which increases initially and starts 
to decrease once the opportunity 
costs of not adopting OD2 
outweigh the benefits from 
retaining OD1. The reorganization 
occurs once the benefits of 
adopting OD2 plus the fixed 
reorganization costs equal OD1. 
The upper panel shows the active number of cell-phone manufacturing firms, industry exits, 
and reorganizations from the inception of the industry in 1983 until December 2008. The lower 
panel plots the reorganizations by type as well as the number of reorganizations that shift the 
interaction structure toward more homogeneous or more heterogeneous units. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Reorganization 1,621 0.06 0.244 0 1 1                           
2 Shift towards hom 
focus 
1,621 0.03 0.170 0 1 0.67 1                         
3 Shift towards het focus 1,621 0.03 0.180 0 1 0.71 -0.03 1                       
4 Days until next reorg 1,621 94.05 483.030 0 6574 0.51 0.41 0.29 1                     
5 Hom/total (1 year lag) 1,568 0.23 0.256 0 1 0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 1                   
6 Het/total (1 year lag) 1,568 0.77 0.256 0 1 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.02 -1.00 1                 
7 ROA (1 year lag) 996 0.02 0.105 -0.443 1.688 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.15 -0.11 0.11 1               
8 Competing rationales 1,621 0.02 0.128 0 1 0.50 0.26 0.43 0.24 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 1             
9 CEO change within 1 
year 
1,621 0.01 0.093 0 1 0.33 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.09 1           
10 Age (ln) 1,621 3.53 1.114 0 5.063 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.17 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.02 1         
11 Degree of 
diversification 
1,621 1.96 0.832 1 3 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.13 -0.13 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 1       
12 # competitors (1 year 
lag) 
1,621 21.78 7.525 0 28 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.22 -0.22 -0.21 0.04 0.03 -0.36 -0.12 1     
13 # industry hom shifts 
(within 1 year) 
1,621 0.21 0.820 0 5 0.85 0.51 0.65 0.49 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.42 0.33 -0.01 0.01 0.14 1   
14 # industry het shifts 
(within 1 year) 
1,621 0.42 1.920 0 12 0.40 0.29 0.26 0.54 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.48 1 
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Table 2: Fixed-effects logit and OLS regressions by type of reorganization 
 
  LOGIT    OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
  
any 
reorg 
any 
reorg 
hom 
shift 
hom 
shift 
het 
shift 
het 
shift   
hom 
shift 
het 
shift 
                    
Hom/total (1 year lag)   -1.042   -5.230   3.899   -0.164 0.158 
    (1.541)   (1.599)   (1.496)   (0.040) (0.051) 
    0.499   0.001   0.009   0.000 0.004 
Het/total (1 year lag) omitted, results for het/total = (-1)*(hom/total), control variables identical   
ROA (1 year lag) 3.068 2.425 0.991 0.011 -1.024 -0.136   0.104 -0.088 
  (10.746) (10.134) (1.190) (1.870) (1.295) (1.356)   (0.115) (0.084) 
  0.775 0.811 0.405 0.995 0.429 0.920   0.370 0.303 
Competing rationales 22.857 23.868 0.583 0.744 1.584 1.453   0.058 0.244 
  (1,665) (2,415) (0.592) (0.650) (0.583) (0.611)   (0.110) (0.154) 
  0.989 0.992 0.324 0.252 0.007 0.018   0.599 0.123 
CEO change within 1 year 0.710 0.306 -0.667 -0.190 1.106 1.498   -0.074 0.204 
  (1.359) (1.533) (0.898) (1.052) (0.807) (0.892)   (0.139) (0.135) 
  0.601 0.842 0.458 0.856 0.171 0.093   0.598 0.142 
Age (ln) 24.176 24.636 0.117 1.380 4.624 3.490   -0.021 0.074 
  (9.601) (9.696) (1.915) (2.123) (1.995) (2.205)   (0.061) (0.056) 
  0.012 0.011 0.951 0.516 0.020 0.113   0.728 0.191 
Degree of diversification 2.153 2.283 0.948 0.876 -0.559 -0.650   0.050 -0.031 
  (1.054) (1.044) (0.488) (0.520) (0.976) (0.987)   (0.008) (0.011) 
  0.041 0.029 0.052 0.092 0.567 0.510   0.000 0.007 
# competitors (1 year lag) -0.288 -0.277 -0.133 -0.115 -0.135 -0.131   -0.000 -0.003 (0.169) (0.170) (0.055) (0.061) (0.068) (0.073)   (0.001) (0.001) 
  0.087 0.104 0.016 0.060 0.047 0.072   0.908 0.018 
# industry hom shifts (within 1 
year) 
6.392 6.463 1.070 1.131 1.246 1.247   0.100 0.128 
(1.765) (1.804) (0.160) (0.178) (0.174) (0.174)   (0.015) (0.017) 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
# industry het shifts (within 1 
year) 
-0.304 -0.302 0.188 0.230 0.020 0.012   0.006 -0.005 
(0.170) (0.171) (0.061) (0.069) (0.065) (0.066)   (0.005) (0.006) 
  0.073 0.077 0.002 0.001 0.757 0.854   0.279 0.347 
Constant               0.031 -0.167 
                (0.204) (0.191) 
                0.879 0.390 
Observations 857 856 840 839 836 815   994 994 
Number of firms 25 25 23 23 23 23   32 32 
Log-Likelihood -18.69 -18.47 -67.72 -58.89 -59.64 -54.90    
R-square         0.296 0.454 
standard errors in parentheses, 
p-values underneath                   
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Table 3: Fixed-effects Poisson and OLS regressions by timing of reorganization 
  Poisson regressions   OLS regressions 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  days until the next reorganization 
            
Hom/total (1 year lag)   -1.711     -383.664 
    (0.775)     (141.952) 
    0.027     0.011 
Het/total (1 year lag) omitted, results for het/total = (-1)*(hom/total), control 
variables identical   
            
ROA (1 year lag) 1.429 1.056   1,041.040 1,029.117 
  (0.356) (0.422)   (838.818) (810.576) 
  0.000 0.012   0.224 0.214 
Competing rationales 0.984 0.923   301.010 280.385 
  (0.527) (0.573)   (256.257) (265.378) 
  0.062 0.107   0.249 0.299 
CEO change within 1 year -0.039 0.036   -142.775 -159.032 
  (0.613) (0.620)   (308.977) (299.479) 
  0.950 0.954   0.647 0.599 
Age (ln) 2.353 3.191   -42.483 53.271 
  (1.198) (1.235)   (90.879) (76.834) 
  0.050 0.010   0.643 0.493 
Degree of diversification 0.101 0.052   35.931 54.769 
  (0.210) (0.214)   (38.703) (37.779) 
  0.630 0.809   0.360 0.157 
# competitors (1 year lag) -0.182 -0.171   -3.878 -1.411 
(0.032) (0.034)   (4.356) (5.063) 
  0.000 0.000   0.380 0.782 
# industry hom shifts (within 1 year) 0.826 0.819   176.156 170.043 
(0.072) (0.079)   (37.444) (37.513) 
  0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
# industry het shifts (within 1 year) 0.254 0.252   99.875 100.994 
(0.037) (0.037)   (26.260) (26.051) 
  0.000 0.000   0.001 0.001 
Constant        182.087 -181.022 
        (305.087) (285.017) 
        0.555 0.530 
            
Observations 996 995   995 994 
Number of firms 32 32   32 32 
Log-Likelihood -115028 -110967       
R-squared       0.401 0.407 
standard errors in parentheses, p-values 
below           
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Coding Example 
For each firm, we started by establishing the current (2008) structure as described on the 
company’s website or latest annual statement. We then searched – over five-year intervals – for 
the company’s name in combination with each of the search terms “reorgani*”, “restruc*”, and 
“change” before browsing through the results (several thousand articles). When this procedure 
yielded a reorganization announcement, we focused on a ±6-month time window around the 
announcement date while selecting articles that provided such details as the rationale for 
reorganizing and descriptions of the old and new structures. For each reorganization we read 
some 50–100 articles, of which we selected for coding roughly 20 that together yielded enough 
information about: (1) the old and new business units and the firm’s overall structure; 
(2) whether or not the CEO changed within the preceding 12 months; (3) the CEO’s statement 
about the reorganization; and (4) whether or not it was accompanied by layoffs. 
In what follows we provide excerpts from various articles on the 2006 reorganization of 
Motorola Inc. Comments within brackets describe particulars concerning how the data were 
coded. 
____________________ 
 
“Motorola, Inc today announced a reorganization of its Networks and Government & Enterprise 
Mobility Solutions businesses into one organization, to be called the Networks & Enterprise 
business. [These unit names are clearly the three “official” labels; we therefore cross-referenced the 
first two names mentioned with the structure that we believed Motorola held before it initiated this 
particular reorganization.] ‘This reorganization will allow us to strengthen our position in 
providing end-to-end network infrastructure solutions to private, public and enterprise customers 
 41 
worldwide,’ said Ed Zander, Chairman and CEO. ‘The new business also will leverage key 
current and next-generation technologies across those various market segments. With a more 
streamlined structure, Motorola will move faster, improve the cost structure of the company, 
including general and administrative activities, and be more effective in meeting customer needs 
going forward.’ [This quote provided us with a first idea of the reorganization’s rationale.]” 
In PR Newswire (U.S.), “Motorola Combines Networks and Government & Enterprise Mobility 
Solutions Businesses; New Organization Will Further Advance Seamless Mobility Strategy, 
Improve Operational Efficiency and Cost Structure” (3 March 2006). 
 
“Motorola Inc. , the world's No. 2 cell-phone maker, said on Friday it is combining its network 
equipment and government and corporate units in a bid to cut costs and win new business. The 
network unit sells equipment that runs cell-phone networks, [This statement gave us a strong 
indication that the focal unit is both product- and market-based and thus heterogeneous.] a segment 
that analysts say has become cutthroat because of too many suppliers. The other business sells 
wireless gear to government and large business clients. [This is likely a market-based unit that 
focuses on government and large business clients.] … ‘I believe it makes sense because it 
eliminates the duplicative research and development between the two divisions,’ [Oppenheimer 
analyst Lawrence] Harris said.” 
In Reuters News, “UPDATE 1—Motorola combining networks, government units” (3 March 
2006). 
 
“ ‘I believe it makes sense because it eliminates the duplicative research and development 
between the two divisions,’ said Oppenheimer analyst Lawrence Harris. ‘The technologies and 
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the pursuits of the two divisions have been coming closer together because the government unit 
[An analyst calls this the “government unit”, which further supports our initial suspicion that it is 
market based.] has been pursuing bids to sell network equipment to public safety agencies and 
state governments,’ he said, noting that they previously focused more on selling walkie-talkie 
radios.” 
In CNET News.com, “Motorola combining networks, government units; Company hasn’t yet said 
how move will help cut costs, but analyst says it will eliminate redundant R&D” (3 March 2006). 
 
“The realignment stands to involve nearly 50 percent of the company’s nearly 70,000 
employees.” 
In CMP TechWeb, “Motorola Merges Two Businesses Units” (3 March 2006). 
 
“John Slack, an analyst with Morningstar Inc. in Chicago, said: ‘It’s somewhat of a surprise to 
see them moving to combine these businesses just after reorganizing them a year ago. I think 
what we’re seeing are the lines blur between a lot of Motorola’s business lines.’ Jane Zweig, 
president of Shosteck Associates, wireless industry analysts in Wheaton, Md., said the 
consolidation makes sense. ‘Both groups deal with networks,’ she said. ‘These products work for 
cellular carriers as well as public safety agencies so the combined group has synergies and makes 
sense strategically. Networks will be able to integrate products for several markets and make 
more use out of Motorola’s R&D.’ [Another indication that our coding of these units as 
heterogeneous was correct.]” 
In Howard Wolinsky, “Motorola merges divisions; no word on layoffs” (Chicago Sun-Times, 
4 March 2006). 
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____________________ 
 
Because all these articles assumed that readers knew what the two old units did, we returned to 
the previous reorganization announcement in which those units were described in detail. 
 
“Motorola will focus the company on the following areas: … 
Networks. Motorola will consolidate its network businesses into a single seamless organization 
to leverage talent, R&D and operating efficiency. The new Networks business will focus on 
existing cellular radio access networks, core IP networks including next generation 
IMS/softswitch technologies, iDEN infrastructure, telco wireline access, embedded 
communications and computer platforms, a new 802.XX mobile broadband group and a services 
and an applications management services business. Adrian Nemcek, president, will lead the new 
Networks business. [This confirms our coding scheme, which labeled the unit as product based.] 
Government and Enterprise. Building on the success of the company’s mission-critical voice and 
data delivery to traditional and emerging customers, Motorola will consolidate its market- and 
solutions-oriented businesses into a new organization that will bring our most advanced seamless 
mobility applications to Fortune 500 class enterprises, governments and automobile 
manufacturers worldwide. Greg Brown, president, will lead the new Government and Enterprise 
business. [This unit is clearly focused on the markets of government and large enterprises.]” 
In PR Newswire (U.S.), “Motorola Realigns Businesses to Drive Seamless Mobility Strategy” 
(13 December 2004). 
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Table 2A: Fixed-effects OLS regressions by type of reorganization 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
any reorg any reorg hom shift hom shift het shift het shift
hom/total (1 year lag) -0.008 -0.164 0.158
(0.057) (0.040) (0.051)
0.892 0.000 0.004
het/total (1 year lag)
ROA (1 year lag) 0.017 0.017 0.108 0.104 -0.091 -0.088
(0.045) (0.045) (0.125) (0.115) (0.097) (0.084)
0.710 0.715 0.397 0.370 0.357 0.303
competing rationales 0.277 0.277 0.034 0.058 0.267 0.244
(0.092) (0.095) (0.110) (0.110) (0.150) (0.154)
0.005 0.006 0.758 0.599 0.084 0.123
ceo change within 1 year 0.110 0.109 -0.061 -0.074 0.190 0.204
(0.125) (0.125) (0.133) (0.139) (0.134) (0.135)
0.389 0.388 0.650 0.598 0.164 0.142
age (ln) 0.053 0.055 -0.048 -0.021 0.100 0.074
(0.023) (0.032) (0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056)
0.024 0.092 0.456 0.728 0.100 0.191
degree of diversification 0.020 0.021 0.041 0.050 -0.022 -0.031
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
0.035 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.007
-0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.004 0.001 0.377 0.908 0.068 0.018
0.236 0.236 0.102 0.100 0.126 0.128
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
0.952 0.954 0.290 0.279 0.358 0.347
Constant -0.145 -0.151 0.141 0.031 -0.271 -0.167
(0.078) (0.106) (0.213) (0.204) (0.201) (0.191)
0.074 0.164 0.514 0.879 0.186 0.390
Observations 995 994 995 994 995 994
R-squared 0.756 0.753 0.278 0.296 0.450 0.454
Number of firms 32 32 32 32 32 32
standard errors in parentheses, p-values below
# competitors (1 year lag)
# industry hom shifts (within 1 
year)
# industry het shifts (within 1 year)
omitted, results for het/total = (-1)*(hom/total), control variables identical
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Table 4: Robustness check – Fixed-effects Poisson regressions with layoffs (Model 1) and 
cost-cutting rationale (Model 2) 
 
(1) (2)
hom/total (1 year lag) -1.704 -1.776
(0.753) (0.714)
0.024 0.013
het/total (1 year lag)
layoffs -0.000
(0.000)
0.877
cost-cutting rationale -0.157
(0.724)
0.828
ROA (1 year lag) 1.058 1.118
(0.423) (0.575)
0.012 0.052
competing rationales 0.914 0.915
(0.599) (0.568)
0.127 0.107
ceo change within 1 year 0.028 0.028
(0.638) (0.627)
0.965 0.964
age (ln) 3.202 3.258
(1.236) (1.251)
0.010 0.009
degree of diversification 0.055 0.055
(0.216) (0.218)
0.798 0.801
-0.171 -0.171
(0.034) (0.034)
0.000 0.000
0.824 0.826
(0.095) (0.072)
0.000 0.000
0.252 0.253
(0.037) (0.036)
0.000 0.000
Observations 995 995
Number of firms 32 32
Log-Likelihood -110951 -110881
standard errors in parentheses, p-values below
# competitors (1 year lag)
# industry hom shifts (within 1 
year)
# industry het shifts (within 1 year)
days until the next reorganization
omitted, results for het/total = (-1)*(hom/total), 
control variables identical
